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AN ERIE APPROACH TO PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE
Megan M. La Belle*
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 1 is no doubt one of the most
historically important cases taught to first-year civil procedure students
each year. 2 In Erie, the Supreme Court overruled the venerable case of
Swift v. Tyson and held that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply
state law—as opposed to federal common law—to substantive questions.3
Over the past 80 years, the Court has revisited the Erie doctrine from timeto-time, announcing various tests to help courts decide whether a rule is
substantive or procedural. 4 In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates., P.A.
v. Allstate Insurance Co., its most recent pronouncement on Erie, the
Court was sharply divided on whether to apply federal or state law on
class actions. 5 Though the majority held that the federal rule should
control, Shady Grove left many questions unanswered. 6
Almost a decade has passed since Shady Grove, and the Court has
yet to take up another Erie case. Perhaps the Court’s lack of activity in
this arena should come as no surprise, as Erie issues arise in practice
relatively infrequently. 7 To be sure, while Erie has been cited in hundreds
* Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. This essay was written
for the Sixth Annual Constitutional Law Conference at the University of Akron School of Law, “Erie
at Eighty: Choice of Law Across Disciplines.” The author thanks the participants at that conference
for their helpful thoughts and comments, as well as Peter Kim for his excellent research assistance.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. See, e.g., Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595 (2008) (stating that
Erie is considered an “icon” and one of the “cultural pillars of our legal architecture”).
3. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80.
4. See infra note 9 (noting the major Erie decisions).
5. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling
Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2011) (“Shady Grove may be best
remembered for the questions it failed to answer rather than the ones that it did.”).
7. See Stephen M. Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket,
LITIG., Spring 1998, at 25, 27 (“On very rare occasions the Court grants certiorari to supervise a
federal appellate court’s application of state law on the theory that the lower court has fundamentally
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of Supreme Court decisions, 8 the major cases can be counted on one
hand. 9 Or maybe the cases where Erie issues do come up involve conflicts
between fairly obscure federal and state rules, and so Supreme Court
review is not warranted. The esoteric nature of the Erie doctrine, in other
words, may cause the Court to turn its attention elsewhere. 10
One space where Erie plays a key role with “real world” implications
is privilege doctrine. 11 This past term, the Court had the opportunity to
review an Erie case—HannStar Display Corp. v. Sony Electronics, Inc.—
that raised an important question about when federal courts should apply
state privilege law. 12 In civil cases, “state law governs privilege regarding
a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”13
That means that federal courts sitting in diversity are supposed to apply
state privilege laws. In HannStar, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit applied federal, rather than California, law regarding the
mediation privilege, despite the fact that the previously-asserted federal
claims had all been dismissed. 14 Though the procedural posture in
HannStar was somewhat unusual, the case still would have been a good
vehicle for the Court to provide some clarity on how federal courts should
approach privilege problems in Erie cases. For whatever reason, however,
the Court denied HannStar’s petition for certiorari. 15
HannStar posed a traditional Erie problem, meaning the federal court
had to decide whether to apply state privilege law. But privilege questions
also appear in “reverse-Erie” situations where state courts must decide if
misperceived the requirements of the Erie doctrine. But this happens only once or twice in a
decade.”).
8. See Alexander A. Reinert, Erie Step Zero, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2341, 2352 n.50 (2017)
(stating that 205 Supreme Court cases have cited Erie).
9. In addition to Erie itself and Shady Grove, mentioned above, there are four other major
cases: Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 357 U.S. 933 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); and Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). See John T. Cross, Contributory and Vicarious Liability for
Trademark Dilution, 80 OR. L. REV. 625, 665 n.138 (2001).
10. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on
What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707 (2006) (describing Erie as an
“esoteric procedural technicality, one whose true meaning is hard to discern and whose application is
impossible to predict”); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 34,
66 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court is primarily a “political organ” and that the picture of the
Justices “poring over esoteric scholarly articles to come to a decision is . . . an unrealistic one”).
11. Reinert, supra note 8, at 2376.
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, HannStar Display Corp. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 138 S.Ct. 378
(Mem) (2017) (No. 16-1457), 2017 WL 2460808 at *i. cert. denied.
13. FED. R. EVID. 501.
14. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. HannStar Display Corp. (In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.),
835 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2016).
15. HannStar Display Corp., 138 S.Ct. at 378.
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they should apply federal privilege law in certain cases.16 One recent
example is In re Silver where the Texas Supreme Court was faced with
the question whether to compel production of communications between
the plaintiff and his patent agent, a non-attorney. 17 Because the underlying
claim was based on state law, the Silver court held that it was not bound
by the federal patent agent privilege. 18 The court nevertheless spent a lot
of time discussing the federal privilege, and ultimately agreed that patent
agent communications are privileged and should be protected from
disclosure under Texas law. 19
This short essay considers the HannStar and Silver cases and begins
a discussion of the impact that the Erie doctrine has—and, more
importantly, ought to have—on privilege law. While Erie is considered
by many as “one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism,” 20 the
doctrine is important too for the change it can effect through the crosspollination of ideas among tribunals. 21 Because privilege laws reflect
deliberate policy choices by legislatures and courts, the Erie doctrine
arguably plays a particularly vital role in developing this area of the law.
I. STATE VS. FEDERAL PRIVILEGE LAW
Evidentiary privileges have existed in some form since our nation’s
legal system was born. 22 Historically, federal privileges were developed
through common law, while state privileges often were creatures of
statutory law. 23 Early on, conflicts about applying federal vs. state
16. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 307 n.3 (2008) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“A
federal court applying state law . . . is not free to follow its own federal rule simply because the issue
arises in federal court. By the same token, a state court considering a federal constitutional claim . . .
is not free to follow its own state-law view on the question simply because the issue arises in state
court.”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 161 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court opines
today that state courts hearing federal suits are obliged to mirror federal procedures to the same extent
that federal courts are obliged to mirror state procedures in diversity suits.”); see also Kevin M.
Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (“Reverse-Erie occupies the opposite
side of the federalism coin from that occupied by the classic Erie cases. In state court, when does state
law apply and when does federal law apply?”).
17. In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. 2017).
18. Id. at 534.
19. Id. at 539. (holding that certain patent agent communications may be protected, if they are
“confidential communications made to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services.”).
20. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. See infra notes 85–90.
22. Martin I. Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Civil Litigation, 43 FORDHAM
L. REV. 923, 924–25 (1975).
23. Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 87 (2002); Kaminsky,
supra note 22, at 924–25; Walter V. Stafford, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 CAL.
L. REV. 639, 641 (1964).
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privilege law were rare.24 But that began to change after 1938—the year
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were adopted and Erie was
decided. For starters, FRCP 43(a) instructed courts to follow rules that
“favor[] the reception of the evidence,” 25 prompting some federal courts
to reject state privilege laws. Erie and its progeny also forced federal
courts to grapple with the question whether privileges were substantive or
procedural in nature, and the courts reached different conclusions.26 In the
end, courts were all over the map about what privilege law to apply, thus
sparking a call for reform.
After years of discussion and debate, the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) were finally enacted in 1975. As initially proposed, the FRE would
have codified nine specific federal privileges. 27 That approach, which
almost doomed the FRE project as a whole, was ultimately rejected by
Congress and FRE 501 was adopted instead. 28 Federal Rule of Evidence
501 says that “[t]he common law—as interpreted by United States courts
in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege
unless” the U.S. Constitution, a federal statute, or Supreme Court rules
provide otherwise. 29 Rule 501 further states that, “in a civil case, state law
governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law
supplies the rule of decision.” 30 This means that federal common law
applies to privilege issues in civil matters based on federal law, while state
privilege applies when the underlying civil claim is based on state law.31
FRE 501 is silent, however, on which privilege law applies when a lawsuit
involves both federal and state law claims. Although Congress clearly

24. Kaminsky, supra note 22, at 926.
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) provided: “All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under
the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the
United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of
general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule
which favors the reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented according to
the most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein
made.”
26. Kaminsky, supra note 22, at 929–30.
27. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment. The nine privileges
included: “required reports, lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications to
clergymen, political vote, trade secrets, secrets of state and other official information, and identity of
informer.” Id.
28. Symposium, Giving Codification A Second Chance-Testimonial Privileges and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769-70 (2002).
29. FED. R. EVID. 501.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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contemplated this problem, as reflected in the Committee notes, it was
unable to reach resolution. 32
In adopting FRE 501, Congress made clear that it “left the law of
privileges in its present state.” 33 That said, Congress never expected for
federal privilege law to remain static; instead, it instructed federal courts
to continue to develop privilege doctrine “in the light of reason and
experience.” 34 As the Supreme Court has explained, federal courts have
the power to define or create “new privileges by interpreting ‘common
law principles.’” 35 Rule 501 “did not freeze the law governing the
privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our history,
but rather directed federal courts to ‘continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges.”’ 36 As part of that evolutionary
development, federal courts ought to give due consideration to state law
privileges, but sometimes give them short shrift.
A.

HannStar v. Sony

Sony Electronics, Inc., who purchased liquid crystal display (LCD)
products from HannStar Display Corporation, accused HannStar of
participating in a price-fixing conspiracy that violated the antitrust laws. 37
In 2010, Sony and HannStar agreed to mediate their dispute and entered
into a tolling agreement. 38 The mediator sent an email to the parties on
March 25, 2012 stating that he was authorized to make a “mediator’s
proposal.” 39 His proposal was to settle the matter for $4.1 million, subject
to the execution of an appropriate settlement agreement. 40 The mediator
instructed the parties that they must respond either “accept” or “reject”
only; no negotiation was permitted. 41 Two days later, Sony and HannStar
both wrote to the mediator accepting his proposal. Ultimately, however,
HannStar backed out of the deal, and Sony sued HannStar in federal court
32. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment (“Another problem not
entirely avoidable is the complexity or difficulty the rule introduces into the trial of a Federal case
containing a combination of Federal and State claims and defenses, e.g. an action involving Federal
antitrust and State unfair competition claims. Two different bodies of privilege law would need to be
consulted.”); see also Kaminsky, supra note 22, at 954–60.
33. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment.
34. FED. R. EVID. 501.
35. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
36. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
37. Hannstar, 835 F.3d at 1156. In 2010, HannStar entered into a plea agreement in which it
admitted to participating in such a conspiracy. Id.
38. Id. at 1157.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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asserting federal and state antitrust claims, a state law fraud claim, and a
state law breach of contract claim for HannStar’s alleged failure to honor
the mediator’s proposal. 42
Before filing suit against HannStar, Sony had sued several other
defendants allegedly involved in the LCD price-fixing scheme. 43 When
that litigation concluded, Sony dismissed its antitrust claims against
HannStar, and continued only to pursue the breach of contract claim. 44
HannStar then moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
but the motion was denied because the court had jurisdiction under the
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 45 Subsequently, Sony moved for
summary judgment on its breach of contract claim and sought to admit
communications made during the mediation. HannStar objected on the
ground that the statements were inadmissible pursuant to California
Evidence Code §§ 1119 and 1123, collectively referred to as the
“mediation privilege.” 46 Section 1119 provides, in relevant part, that:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter:
No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of,
in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation
is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall
not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil
action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law,
testimony can be compelled to be given. 47

Section 1123(b) goes on to say that, despite this general prohibition
against disclosure, executed agreements that make clear they are
“enforceable or binding” will be admissible. 48
Because subject matter jurisdiction was based on diversity,
California privilege law controlled. Applying the mediation privilege, the

42. Id. at 1157–58; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at *2.
43. See In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 637 Fed.App’x 981 (9th Cir. 2016).
44. Hannstar, 835 F.3d at 1157-58.
45. Id. at 1158.
46. Id.
47. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119(a) (West 2018).
48. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1123 (West 2018). In full, that section provides: “A written settlement
agreement prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation, is not made inadmissible, or
protected from disclosure, by provisions of this chapter if the agreement is signed by the settling
parties and any of the following conditions are satisfied: (a) The agreement provides that it is
admissible or subject to disclosure, or words to that effect. (b) The agreement provides that it is
enforceable or binding or words to that effect. (c) All parties to the agreement expressly agree in
writing, or orally in accordance with Section 1118, to its disclosure. (d) The agreement is used to
show fraud, duress, or illegality that is relevant to an issue in dispute.” Id. § 1123 (emphasis added).
Sony was relying on § 1123(b) to argue their agreement with HannStar was subject to disclosure.
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district court held that the communications were inadmissible because the
exception in § 1123(b) did not apply, meaning the agreement between
Sony and HannStar did not expressly state that the parties intended it to
be enforceable or binding. 49 In reaching this conclusion, the district court
emphasized that California courts have strictly construed these statutory
provisions, making clear that a communication is inadmissible unless it
“falls squarely within an express statutory exception to mediation
confidentiality,” even where, as here, the result may seem inequitable.50
The parties then stipulated to judgment for HannStar and Sony appealed.
On appeal, Sony relied on a recently-decided Ninth Circuit case,
Wilcox v. Arpaio, to argue that the district court should have applied
federal law instead of the California mediation privilege.51 In Wilcox,
plaintiffs sued Maricopa County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various
Arizona state law claims for violating their civil rights.52 The parties then
entered mediation, and the county allegedly agreed to settle for $975,000.
But when the county backed out and failed to pay, plaintiffs filed a motion
to enforce the settlement. 53 In support of their motion, plaintiffs offered
communications from the mediation, which the county claimed were
protected from disclosure by Arizona’s mediation privilege. 54 The district
court and Ninth Circuit both agreed with plaintiffs, admitted the mediation
statements, and enforced the settlement agreement. In so doing, the Ninth
Circuit explicitly considered the choice-of-law question and held that, in
federal question cases, federal courts are not bound by state law where the
same evidence relates to both federal and state law claims. 55 The court
went on to say that it was not deciding whether, in federal question cases,
“state or federal privilege law governs the admissibility of evidence that
relates exclusively to state law claims.” 56 Nor did the court decide whether
to adopt a federal mediation privilege because the county waived that
argument. 57
Turning back to HannStar, in a remarkably terse 2-1 opinion, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with Sony that Wilcox controlled and reversed the

49. HannStar, 835 F.3d at 1158.
50. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, MDL No. 1827, No. C 1202214 SI, 2013 WL 6326707, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013), rev’d and remanded, 835 F.3d 1155
(9th Cir. 2016).
51. Wilcox v. Arpaio, 753 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2014).
52. Id. at 874.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 875.
55. Id. at 876.
56. Id. at 876 n.3.
57. Id. at 877.
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district court. 58 The majority admitted that this case was different than
Wilcox since all federal claims had been dismissed. 59 But it nonetheless
held that Wilcox was on point because “at the time the parties engaged in
mediation, their negotiations concerned (and the mediated settlement
settled) both federal and state law claims.” 60 By deciding that federal
rather than California privilege law controlled, the majority avoided a
potentially difficult question of state law—i.e., whether the trial court was
correct in finding that the agreement between Sony and HannStar failed
to provide it was enforceable or binding as required by Cal. Evid. Code §
1123. 61 The dissent, on the other hand, concluded that the district court
properly applied California privilege law because, at the time Sony moved
for summary judgment, “the action no longer involved any federal issue,
[so] the evidence could not relate to a federal claim.” 62
Notably, the court in HannStar—unlike in Wilcox—said very little
about the choice-of-law analysis. And what the court does say is odd.
Although jurisdiction in HannStar was based on diversity, the court cites
Agster v. Maricopa County 63 for the proposition that “[w]here there are
federal question claims and pendent state law claims present, the federal
law of privilege applies.” 64 Moreover, the court suggests that the choiceof-law analysis should be different for cases involving settlement
agreements but fails to explain why. 65 Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, the HannStar court spends almost no time on the competing
state law. There’s no discussion of the policy behind the mediation
privilege, no consideration of the potential impact non-enforcement of
California’s rule might have, and no mention whatsoever of federal courts
recognizing a mediation privilege of their own.
HannStar is a tough case because, arguably, it came to the “right”
result for the parties in that case—the Ninth Circuit prevented HannStar
from backing out of the deal it had made. 66 To get there, though, the court
58. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. HannStar Display Corp. (In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.),
835 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2016).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1159.
61. See supra notes 47–48.
62. Hannstar, 835 F.3d at 1159 (Lynn, J., dissenting).
63. 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2005).
64. Hannstar, 835 F.3d at 1158.
65. Id. (stating that in Wilcox “[W]e clarified the meaning of [FRE 501] for a state suit to
enforce a settlement of both federal and state claims.”).
66. A review of the transcript from oral argument indicates that Judge Graber believed this
case was settled and HannStar should have to abide by that agreement. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, Hannstar, 835 F.3d 1155 (No. 14-15916), 2016 WL 4595814. (“Your client could accept
[the mediator’s proposal], your client could reject it. And what it said, is the matter is going to be
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had to the ignore important Erie-related questions—e.g., under Erie and
FRE 501, why should federal privilege law apply where the underlying
evidence relates only to a state law claim and jurisdiction is based
exclusively on diversity? Will applying federal law in the case lead to
different treatment of diverse litigants and/or encourage forum shopping?
Equally troubling is the Ninth Circuit’s failure to take into account
California’s interest in having its privilege law apply—a law that the
California legislature intentionally made broad “to encourage the candor
necessary to a successful mediation.” 67 While HannStar failed to take the
competing privilege law into account, Silver dealt with it head on.
B.

In re Silver

Andrew Silver owned a patent on the Ziosk, a tablet that allows
restaurant customers to order and pay without having to interact with a
server. 68 Silver claimed that he sold the patent to TableTop Media LLC,
and that he was owed royalties pursuant to the parties’ patent purchase
agreement. After Silver sued for breach of contract in Texas state court,
TableTop sought production of hundreds of communications between
Silver and his patent agent, who was not a lawyer. 69 Although a full
description of the role of patent agents is unnecessary, 70 suffice it to say
that they are technically-trained non-lawyers who: (i) have passed the
Patent Registration Exam administered by the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office (PTO); and (ii) are authorized to draft patent applications and
negotiate with the PTO to issue patents, which, according to the U.S.
Supreme Court, is “the practice of law.” 71
Silver refused to respond to TableTop’s request for production on the
grounds that the communications should be protected by the patent-agent
privilege—a common law privilege that had been recently created in In
re Queen’s Univ. at Kingston by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the appellate court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.72
Notably, shortly before the Federal Circuit decided Queen’s, the PTO
launched its own efforts to protect patent agent communications. 73 Those
settled no litigation. That’s the whole point of it. . . . I guess I just have difficulties seeing why that
isn’t words to the effect that all you can do is accept it and if you accept it, it’s settled.”).
67. Cassel v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 113, 117 (2011).
68. In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d 530, 532-33 (Tex. 2018).
69. Id. at 533.
70. For a longer discussion of the history and current status of patents agents, see Megan M.
La Belle, Privilege for Patent Agents, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 350 (2017).
71. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963).
72. 820 F.3d 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
73. La Belle, supra note 70, at 366.
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efforts ultimately culminated in the PTO promulgating a rule entitled
“Privilege for patent practitioners” that is, in some ways, broader than the
Federal Circuit’s common law privilege. 74
TableTop moved to compel Silver to produce the communications
with his patent agent arguing that state law—which did not recognize a
patent agent privilege—should apply since the underlying claim was for
breach of contract. The trial court agreed with TableTop and granted the
motion to compel. Silver sought mandamus relief, which the court of
appeals denied in a 2-1 decision. 75 The majority found that the federal
patent agent privilege did not apply because this was a state law contract
dispute. Because Texas did not recognize a patent agent privilege, and the
court declined to create one, the majority upheld the order granting
TableTop’s motion to compel. 76 Silver then sought mandamus review at
the Texas Supreme Court.
In an opinion issued last year, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and
held that Silver’s communications with his patent agent were privileged.77
This conclusion, though obviously important for patent agents and their
clients, is less notable for our purposes than the court’s analysis in this
“reverse-Erie” case. From the start, the court said that the case was
governed by state law and, thus, was not bound by the federal patent-agent
privilege. The court, naturally, could have stopped there and simply
affirmed the lower courts’ decisions to compel production. But instead,
the Texas Supreme Court recognized the federal interest at stake,
considered federal law on the issue as persuasive authority, 78 and
ultimately decided that the Texas statute governing lawyer-client privilege
“extends to communications between a registered patent agent and the
agent’s client.” 79 Specifically, Texas Rule of Evidence 503 defines
“lawyer” for purposes of privilege as “a person authorized. . . to practice
law in any state or nation.” 80 Thus, because patent agents are authorized
to practice law before the PTO, which is in this nation, the court held that
their communications fall within the attorney-client privilege. 81

74. 37 C.F.R. § 42.57.
75. In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. 2018).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 532.
78. Id. at 534 (“Both cases may be viewed as persuasive authority that the work of a registered
patent agent is the practice of law, although neither speaks directly to the meaning of the phrase under
Texas law.”).
79. Id. at 533.
80. TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(3) (emphasis added).
81. Silver, 540 S.W.3d at 538.
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Even though the court in Silver, like in HannStar, decided to apply
its own law, that’s where the similarities between the cases end. To begin,
the Texas Supreme Court got the Erie analysis (or, more precisely, the
reverse-Erie analysis) right by applying state law since the only claim in
Silver was a state law claim, whereas the Ninth Circuit botched it in
HannStar by applying federal law when only a state law claim remained.
An even starker difference is how the two courts treated the competing
privilege. In HannStar, the Ninth Circuit hardly discussed the California
mediation privilege at all, other than explaining how the district court
applied it. 82 The Silver court, by contrast, carefully considered the federal
patent agent privilege and ultimately interpreted Texas privilege law in a
way that was consistent with the federal rule. 83 This “cross-pollination”
and “migration of ideas” that we see in Silver is a key benefit of Erie that
should be encouraged and embraced for the development of privilege
doctrine. 84
II. PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE AND CROSS-POLLINATION
The Erie doctrine can be complicated, vague, and quite difficult to
apply. 85 It’s no wonder that some courts shy away from Erie problems, as
the Ninth Circuit did in HannStar. Yet, for all the work Erie requires, a
real upside is the opportunity for “intersystemic cross-pollination.” 86
Intersystemic cross-pollination, which has a long history in American
jurisprudence, refers to the interaction between federal and state courts
when reviewing each other’s laws. 87 As Martin Redish explains:
State courts have, since the nation’s founding, played an important role
as interpreters and enforcers of federal law. Similarly, the federal
judiciary has had the opportunity to place its mark on the evolution of
82. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. HannStar Display Corp. (In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.),
835 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2016).
83. Silver, 540 S.W.3d at 533.
84. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1562 (1997).
85. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology As “Law”
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1903 n.4 (2011) (discussing the “complicated Erie story”).
86. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1772
(1992); see also Gluck, supra note 85, at 1992 (urging federal courts to be open to “crosssystemic pollination of interpretive theory”); Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the
Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 325–26 (1994)(“[F]ederal court ascertainment of state law,
even if subsequently proven wrong, has a positive, normative effect on the development of state
law. . . .”).
87. Redish, supra note 86, at 1772–73; see also Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation
Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851, 1867 (1997).
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both state common law and statutory interpretation. In both cases, it is
accurate to say that each level of sovereignty has benefited from the
thoughtful input of the other. 88

Redish goes on to say that it’s hard to know whether this intersystemic
cross-pollination was intentional or purely a fortuitous consequence of our
jurisdictional framework. 89 Either way, he argues, the evolution of
American law has benefitted from it. 90
With respect to privilege law, however, the intentions are rather
clear. In enacting FRE 501, Congress expected federal courts to develop
privilege doctrine “in the light of reason and experience.” 91 What is more,
pursuant to FRE 501, Congress established a framework where federal
courts were called upon to apply state privileges. 92 It is therefore likely
that Congress anticipated that the evolution of federal privilege law would
be shaped and influenced by what was happening in the states. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recognized this synergy between state and federal
privilege law in Jaffee v. Redmond, holding that “the existence of a
consensus among the States indicates that ’reason and experience’ support
recognition of [a federal psychotherapist-patient] privilege.” 93 Finally,
privilege laws reflect public policy choices more than typical procedural
rules, thus suggesting that federal courts should not only consider—but
should generally defer—to state privilege choices. 94
The two cases highlighted in this essay are good examples of when
cross-pollination of privilege doctrine works, and when it doesn’t. In
Silver, the Texas Supreme Court duly considered the federal patent agent
privilege, and consequently developed privilege doctrine in a way that
harmonized Texas with federal law, yet preserved independence for state
courts. 95 As HannStar demonstrates, in contradistinction, privilege
doctrine is unlikely to evolve if courts show no regard for the other
tribunal’s rule. That is not to say that the Ninth Circuit necessarily should
have adopted a mediation privilege in HannStar. But certainly it was
worthy of discussion given how widespread this privilege is among the

88. Redish, supra note 86, at 1773.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. FED. R. EVID. 501.
92. Id.
93. 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996).
94. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence on Privileges,
One of the Most Influential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted: The Strength of the Ingroup Loyalty
of the Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REV. 41, 57 (2006).
95. In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. 2018).
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states, 96 and the fact that federal courts generally embrace and promote
mediation and other types of alternative dispute resolution. 97
The Erie doctrine, in both the traditional and reverse varieties,
promotes the “migration of ideas” about privilege doctrine between
federal and state courts. Of course, courts have to consider the privilege
law of other jurisdictions outside of the Erie context, and those cases also
contribute to this phenomenon. Moreover, courts and legislatures are no
longer the only tribunals creating and adjudicating privileges, as
administrative agencies like the PTO have entered the fray and surely will
impact how courts interpret and apply privileges. 98 While a full
exploration of this cross-pollination of privilege doctrine is beyond the
scope of this brief essay, it is worthy of further study. 99

96. Marcia S. Cohen, The Mediation Privilege, 87 FLA. B.J. 14, 16 (2013) (“All states except
Delaware have enacted some form of mediation privilege.”).
97. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494 (1986).
98. See La Belle, supra note 70; see also Mila Sohoni, The Power to Privilege, 163 U. PENN.
L. REV. 487 (2015) (“Congress has for the first time expressly delegated to an administrative agency
the power to write rules of privilege.”).
99. I am currently working on an article, tentatively titled “Privileges and Cross-Pollination,”
that explores these questions in more depth.

